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SIXTH CIRCUIT SURVEY OF CONTRACTS 
Kathleen E. Paynet 
INTRODUCTION 
Within the survey period, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
viewed seven cases involving contract issues. One case from Ohio 
dealt with the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel to 
a statute of frauds defense in a real estate transaction. Three cases 
examined the recurring issue of the proper measure of damages, 
discussing specific performance, restitution as appropriate relief in 
a case involving mutual mistake, and the inappropriateness of fair 
market value as the measure of damages where a horse auctioneer 
fails to honor a reserve bid price. 
Two other cases faced the problem of distinguishing tort issues 
from contract issues. The first case addressed the question of 
whether Michigan law recognizes a cause of action in tort for the 
negligent performance of a contract. The second case discussed the 
effectiveness of contract disclaimers in barring recovery for tor-
tious misrepresentation. The final case, and the only one of the 
survey period decided under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, allocated risk of loss between sellers and buyers where an 
underground propane gas storage facility collapsed and the stored 
gas could no longer be removed. 
I. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
In Seale v. Citizens Savings & Loan Assoc.,! the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, applying Ohio law in a diversity action, reversed 
the district court's holding that an oral agreement to repurchase 
t B.A., Michigan State University, 1967; M.A., Eastern Michigan University, 1970; J.D., 
Detroit College of Law, 1977; LL.M., University of Michigan, 1981; Professor of Law, De-
troit College of Law. 
Ed. Note - Prior to joining the faculty of the Detroit College of Law in 1980, Professor 
Payne served as law clerk to Justice Blair Moody, Jr. of the Michigan Supreme Court. Pro-
fessor Payne teaches Commercial Transactions, Secured Transactions, and Bankruptcy. She 
also serves as Faculty Advisor to the Law Review. Her writing commitment, dedication, and 
friendship to the students at the Detroit College of Law is greatly appreciated. 
1. 806 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1986). 
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real estate was enforceable.2 The Sixth Circuit refused to fashion 
Ohio law that would permit the use of the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel to override a statute of frauds defense in a real estate con-
text. 3 The statute of frauds was an absolute bar to the contract 
action; nevertheless, the case was remanded for a new trial on the 
tort cause of action! 
Factually, Seale purchased two buildings from Citizens Saving's 
and Loan in 1980, at the suggestion of Robert Rogers, a director of 
Citizens and Seale's accountant. The buildings were purchased in a 
sale-leaseback transaction, documented by a deed, a promissory 
note, a mortgage, and a lease. Before signing the documents, Seale 
commented to Rogers about the absence of a written repurchase 
agreement. At that time and subsequently on repeated occasions, 
Rogers assured Seale that they had a repurchase agreement, but no 
writing ever materialized. II 
Shortly thereafter, Rogers died and Citizens subsequently de-
nied that it had any obligation to repurchase the real estate. Seale 
filed this suit against Citizens and its directors for breach of con-
tract and fraud. At trial the jury was charged with answering spe-
cial interrogatories. Their answers to the interrogatories included a 
finding that Rogers made an oral repurchase agreement with Seale, 
and that Seale would not have entered into the agreement in the 
absence of a repurchase agreement. The jury further found that 
Rogers was Citizens' agent, and that Rogers did not intend to com-
ply with the oral agreement. Finally, the jury found that failure to 
enforce the oral agreement would be "grossly unfair."6 Based upon 
the jury's findings, the district court ordered specific performance 
of the oral repurchase agreement.7 
Although Citizens alleged four errors on appeal, only one allega-
2. [d. at 101. 
3. [d. at 104. 
4. [d. at 106. 
5. [d. at 101 
6. Undoubtedly, this finding resulted from an interrogatory intended to illicit whether 
justice requires that the court grant a remedy. Promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine 
applied to act as a substitute for consideration or the writing requirement of the statute of 
frauds. Accordingly, when the doctrine is applied, relief is only granted to avoid unfairness 
and injustice. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 comments a & b (1979). In-
terestingly, the comments note that the requirement of consideration is more easily dis-
placed than the requirement of a writing. 
7. 806 F.2d at 101. 
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tion is significant in the contracts law arena. Citizens argued that 
Ohio law does not recognize promissory estoppel where the statute 
of frauds would bar enforcement of an alleged agreement involving 
real estate. Stating that Ohio courts have never addressed this 
question, the Sixth Circuit was nevertheless persuaded that Ohio 
courts would be unwilling to apply the doctrine to statute of frauds 
cases involving real estate.s 
In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit, reviewed Ohio 
case law dealing with the importance of the statute of frauds writ-
ing requirement in a real property transaction. Citing to a 1921 
case, Newman v. Newman,9 the court examined the rationale for a 
writing requirement in a real property transaction, even where eq-
uitable relief appeared appropriate. Furthermore, although Ohio 
has adopted the doctrine of promissory estoppel both as a substi-
tute for considerationlO and as a substitute for writing,!l Ohio 
courts have never dealt directly with the question of dispensing 
with the writing requirement in a real estate transaction. l2 
The Sixth Circuit's reluctance to extend the application of 
promissory estoppel to dispense with the writing requirement in a 
case involving real estate is understandable in light of the very spe-
cial facts of the instant case. The purpose of the statute of frauds 
8. [d. at 102. 
9. 103 Ohio St. 230, 133 N.E. 70 (1921). 
10. The Sixth Circuit refers to Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 483 
N.E. 2d 150 (1985), as a case adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 as Ohio 
law. Section 90 states the classic use of promissory estoppel, that of justifiable reliance dis-
pensing with the requirement of consideration to avoid injustice: 
[d. 
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or 
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce 
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforce-
ment of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice 
requires. 
The late Professor Grant Gilmore discussed the doctrine of promissory estoppel as caus-
ing the decline and fall of general contract theory in his aptly titled book, THE DEATH OF 
CONTRACTS. See generally G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974). 
11. A new section in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 139, compliments § 90 
by applying the reliance theory to an oral contract subject to the statute of frauds writing 
requirement. The Sixth Circuit opinion refers to Gathagan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 
23 Ohio App.3d 16, 490 N.E. 2d 923 (1985), as the Ohio case adopting the legal principle. 
The reader might be initially confused when examining the case, since the Ohio Court of 
Appeals referred to and quoted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) section with the Tentative Draft 
section number, § 217A. 
12. 806 F.2d at 102. 
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writing requirement, as reiterated by the court, is to avoid fraud 
and mistake. In the Seale case, only Seale and Rogers were privy 
to the oral repurchase agreement. In light of Rogers' death, only 
one party to the oral agreement is available for examination, 
thereby subjecting the terms of the repurchase agreement to the 
recollections of one individual. As indicated by the Sixth Circuit, 
had the agreement been reduced to a writing, there would be little 
opportunity for fraud, despite Rogers'death.13 
Nevertheless, the Ohio Court of Appeals' case of Gathagan v. 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,a suggests that a different result 
could have been reached in the instant case. Gathagan adopted 
Section 139 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, to allow 
promissory estoppel to defeat the statute of frauds as a defense to 
an oral employment contract for two years. Rather than quoting 
the Restatement Second section directly, the Ohio court quoted it 
as used in a 1970 Hawaii case,16 as follows: 
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action 
or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which 
does induce the action or forebearance is enforceable notwithstanding 
the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of 
the promise. The remedy granted for breach is to be limited as justice 
requires. 
(2) In determining whether injustice can be avoided only by enforcement 
of the promise, the following circumstances are significant: 
(a) the availability and adequacy of other remedies, particularly 
cancellation and restitution; 
(b) the definite and substantial character of the action or for-
bearance in relation to the remedy sought; 
(c) the extent to which the action or forbearance corroborates 
evidence of the making and terms of the promise, or the making 
and terms are otherwise established by clear and convincing 
evidence; 
(d) the reasonableness of the action or forbearance; 
(e) the extent to which the action or forbearance was foreseeable 
by the promisor. '6 
13. Id. at 104. 
14. See note 11 supra. 
15. McIntosh v. Murphy, 52 Hawaii 29, 35-36, 469 P.2d 177, 181 (1970). Because the 
Ohio court quoted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) section from a 1970 case, it refers to the 
Tentative Draft section number rather than the official section number. See note 11 supra. 
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (1979). Ohio is the only state in the 
Sixth Circuit with a case cited under this section in the Case Citations to the Restatement 
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The Ohio Court of Appeals in Gathagan, then went on to state 
that in promissory estoppel cases, since each case turns on its own 
facts, whether the promisee's reliance is sufficient to justify estop-
ping the promisor from raising the statute of frauds as a defense is 
a question of fact to be decided by the jury.I7 Accordingly, the 
Gathagan case required a remand for the jury to consider the issue 
of estoppel. 
In the Seale case, it appears that the estoppel issue was placed 
before the jury in a series of interrogatories. IS Therefore, while the 
Sixth Circuit's reluctance to apply promissory estoppel and Re-
statement Second section 139 to the Seale oral repurchase agree-
ment in light of Rogers' death appears appropriate, the approach 
of Gathagan will undoubtedly eventually be applied to a real es-
tate transaction. While no case has been found applying section 
139 to a real estate repurchase agreement, several cases have been 
decided applying the section to real property leases.I9 Finally, it 
should be noted that prior to the drafting of section 139, promis-
sory or equitable estoppel was used to defeat a statute of frauds 
bar.20 For example, in the 1965 case of Oxley v. Ralston Purina 
CO.,2I the Sixth Circuit finding no controlling Michigan law on the 
problem,22 affirmed the district court's use of the doctrine of equi-
table estoppel to avoid a statute of frauds bar to an oral contract 
which could not be performed within one year.23 The Sixth Circuit 
quoted Williston with approval, "We can see no good reason for 
of the Law. 
17. 23 Ohio App. 3d 16, 490 N.E.2d 923, 925 (1985). 
18. 806 F.2d at 101. 
19. Farash v. Sykes Datatronics, 465 N.Y.S.2d 917, 59 N.Y.2d 500, 452 N.E.2d 1245 
(1983); Hawaiian Trust Co. v. Cowan, 4 Haw. App. 166,663 P.2d 634 (1983), Wachovia Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Rubish, 306 N.C. 417, 293 S.E.2d 749, reh'g denied, 306 N.C. 753, 302 S.E.2d 
884 (1982). 
20. Johnson v. Pattison, 185 N.W.2d 790 (Iowa 1971); 2 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 3406, at 
406 (1963). 
21. 349 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1965). 
22. Michigan cases applying equitable estoppel to oral contracts to convey real property 
were found. 
If one party to an oral contract, in reliance upon the contract, has performed his 
obligation thereunder so that it would be a fraud upon him to allow the other 
party to repudiate the contract, by interposing the statute, equity will regard the 
contract as removed from the operation of the statute [of frauds). 
Brummel v. Brummel, 363 Mich. 447, 1090 N.W.2d 782 (1961). 
23. 349 F.2d 328, 335-36 (1965). 
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limiting the operation of this equitable doctrine to any particular 
class of contracts included within the statute of frauds, provided 
always the essential elements of an estoppel are present .... "24 
II. THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 
A. Specific Performance 
The case of Trans Union Credit Information Co. u. Associated 
Credit Seruices,2r. raises the question of the availability of specific 
performance as a remedy for breach of a term of years service con-
tract. The controversy arose as a consequence of a contract entered 
into by Trans Union Credit (TUC) and Credit Bureau of Cincin-
nati, Inc. (CBC) on September 11, 1985. 
TUC is a national electronic data processing and credit reporting 
company, while CBC is the major local credit bureau in Cincinnati, 
with almost ninety five percent of the market. TUC entered into 
negotiations with CBC to exchange credit reporting services, ena-
bling TUC to postpone its plan to develop its own file of credit 
information on Cincinnati area residents.26 Under the agreement 
reached, each of the two parties would provide the other with un-
restricted access to its computer file of credit information. The 
original agreement included a five year term with successive five-
year renewals. This term of the agreement was amended to provide 
for termination of the agreement after three years on six month 
notice, if all of CBC's stock were sold. Two weeks after executing 
the agreement, Associated Credit Service (ACS) made an offer to 
purchase all of CBC's stock for twelve million dollars. Since ACS is 
a competitor of TUC, TUC attempted to block the sale of CBC's 
stock with a temporary restraining order. TUC was unsuccessful in 
its attempt, and after ACS refused to give TUC assurance that it 
would perform the CBC-TUC service contract, and after ACS 
failed to give TUC a "test tape" necessary to transfer CBC's 
database of credit information to TUC's computer system, TUC 
renewed its motion for injunctive relief.27 On January 3, 1986, CBC 
sent TUC a letter terminating the agreement. The district court 
24. [d. at 336 (quoting 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 533A, at 803 (3d ed. 1960». 
25. 805 F.2d 188 (6th Cir. 1986). 
26. [d. at 190. 
27. [d. at 191. 
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granted the injunction, which was subsequently lifted by a compro-
mise of the parties to try all issues regarding the validity of the 
CBC-TUC credit information exchange agreement. The district 
court found that this service agreement was enforceable and 
granted specific performance of the contract to TUC.28 
Three errors are raised on appeal. First it is contended that TUC 
repudiated the contract prior to CBC's letter of January 3, for-
mally terminating the agreement. Second, it is alleged that specific 
performance is an improper remedy because it compels long con-
tinuing performance between two adversarial parties. Finally, it is 
claimed that the district court's specific performance decree is too 
imprecise and lacking in specificity to be enforceable. 
With respect to the first issue, although the Sixth Circuit refers 
to several cases holding that a disagreement over contract interpre-
tation does not constitute a contract repudiation, the court actu-
ally decides the case on the basis of the specific facts. The January 
3rd letter sent by CBC to TUC attempting to terminate the agree-
ment did not mention the subsequently claimed repudiation. Ac-
cordingly, the court found that if the repudiation had actually oc-
curred, CBC would have mentioned it in the judicial proceedings 
or in its letter of January 3. 
The more interesting question presented is whether specific per-
formance is appropriate in light of the long-termed continuing na-
ture of the service agreement. The Sixth Circuit correctly states 
the standard for determining whether specific performance should 
be awarded; specific performance is an equitable remedy awarded 
only where there is no adequate remedy at law.29 The problem is 
the lack of ability to compensate with dollars for the loss of CBC's 
database. so Because of CBC's monopolistic position, TUC is unable 
to contract with a competitor and obtain the cover differential as a 
remedy. 
The problem with the grant of specific performance in this case 
is not that there is an adequate remedy at law, but the compelled 
continuing performance obligations of the parties under the con-
tract. Assuming the proper six month notice, the contract term be-
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 192. DAN B. DOBBS ON REMEDIES 57 (1973) [hereinafter DAN B. DOBBS]. 
30. It should be noted that TUC does have access to this information outside the service 
agreement through procedures prescribed by the credit reporting trade association. Id. 
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tween the parties is three years. The issue turns on whether the 
case requires too much continuing supervision by the court. Judi-
cial resources are limited, accordingly, specific performance is fre-
quently denied if the contract involves a lengthy performance 
which would require continuing supervision by the court.31 Histori-
cally in the construction contract arena, courts have denied specific 
performance stressing the difficulties of long-term supervision of a 
decree which orders a defendant to build or repair. 32 The modern 
trend, however, is towards greater liberality in decreeing specific 
performance of such contracts.33 On the other hand, specific per-
formance continues to be unavailable in personal service contracts, 
because of the inability of a court decree to create a good working 
relationship, and because such a decree is suggestive of involuntary 
servitude.34 
The service contract in the instant case is more similar to the 
construction contract than the personal service contract, since a re-
lationship of individual employer and employee is not involved.35 
Nevertheless, the problem of long continuing performance between 
competitive parties does exist. The Sixth Circuit answers this con-
cern without case citation, by pointing to the trade association 
guidelines by which other competing credit bureaus must abide.36 
The decision is consistent with the willingness of courts in recent 
decades to take on the supervision of complex school desegregation 
and legislative reapportionment plans. 
Finally, the Sixth Circuit addressed the question of a lack of 
specificity with respect to the district court order. Every order 
granting injunctive relief must be specific in its terms.37 The court 
31. DAN B. DOBBS, supra note 29, at 63; J. CALAMARI & J. PERRILLO, THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS 672 (1987). 
32. Courts refused to specifically enforce contracts that call for complex acts over a pe-
riod of time. This has particularly been true in cases seeking specific performance of con-
struction contracts but also in contracts requiring continuing services of various kinds and 
in contracts requiring long term delivery of goods. This last category clearly appears to have 
been overturned by the Uniform Commercial Code, where it had not already been over-
turned by judicial decision. CALAMARI & PERRILLO, supra note 31, at 672-73 (footnotes 
omitted). 
33. SA CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1171-1172 (1963). 
34. DAN B. DOBBS, supra note 29, at 63. 
3S. Although the services in the instant contract are unique, justifying specific perform-
ance, the services of a specific person are not required. 
36. 80S F.2d at 193. 
37. FED. R. CIV. P. 6S(d) requires the specificity. 
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rule applies to every decree of specific performance, and thus, such 
decrees, unlike other contract remedy orders, require specificity. 
Since the district court merely directed the parties to comply with 
the terms of the service agreement, the Sixth Circuit remanded the 
instant case with instructions that the district court expressly enu-
merate the obligations of each of the parties under the decree.38 
B. Restitution 
The case of Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. Mann,39 re-
quired an analysis of the appropriateness of restitution as a rem-
edy in light of a mutual mistake of fact. In September of 1980, 
Mann contacted Shears on to get advice about selling Cox Elec-
tronic Systems stock. Although the knowledge of the parties at the 
time is unclear, it is undisputed that Cox Electronics had been 
purchased by a Utah corporation, Universal Energy, Inc.40 Shear-
son's employee quoted Mann a price per share in Universal Energy 
Corporation, a Washington corporation, and two months later, 
Mann directed the employee to sell the stock. Shearson took pos-
session of Mann's Cox Electronics stock certificates, believing that 
they represented shares of Universal Energy Corporation. Mann 
received $26,500 for the stock, less a commission of $500 charged 
for the transaction. The sale proceeds were used by Mann as a 
down payment on three real estate investments. 
Shearson eventually discovered the mistake regarding the two 
Universal Energy concerns. Since the brokered stock was actually 
worthless, Shearson purchased 4,000 shares of Universal Energy 
Corporation on the open market for $64,000 to cover the loss re-
sulting from the mistaken sale!l Shears on demanded that the sale 
be rescinded on the basis of mutual mistake, that Mann return the 
$26,500 and pay $64,000, the cost of purchasing the stock to cover 
Shearson's loss. Mann refused, and this cause of action was filed in 
the district court. The original complaint sought both restitution 
of the $26,500 and payment of $64,836.40.42 However, after numer-
38. 805 F.2d at 194. 
39. 814 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1987). 
40. Id. at 303. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 304. The $64,836.40 represented the cost of purchasing the stock on the open 
market plus a brokerage commission. Id. 
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ous pre-trial motions and orders, a hearing was held in December 
of 1985, at which time Shearson maintained that it only sought 
restitution. In January of 1986, the district court granted Shear-
son's motion for summary judgment. The district court held that 
Shearson was entitled to restitution of the $26,500, since it paid 
the money under the mistaken belief that the stock represented 
shares in Universal Energy Corporation, a Washington corporation, 
when in fact the stock represented shares in Universal Energy, 
Inc., a Utah corporation.'3 The instant appeal to the Sixth Circuit 
resulted from this summary judgment. 
These facts represent the classic case of mutual mistake, where 
the parties are mistaken as to the identity of the subject matter of 
the contract." A mutual mistake occurs when both parties are 
under substantially the same erroneous belief as to the facts.' 11 In 
deciding whether a contact is based upon a mistake of both of the 
parties, three factors are considered: whether the mistake is to a 
basic assumption on which the contract is made; whether the mis-
take has a material effect on the agreed exchange; and whether the 
risk of mistake has not been allocated to the disadvantaged 
party.'6 The adversely affected party's remedy for mutual mistake 
is avoidance of the contract, entitling both parties to restitution:" 
Although the term restitution has a very flexible meaning, the 
basic premise of restitution is that a party must restore a benefit 
conferred to avoid unjust enrichment.'s The basic aim of a restitu-
43. [d. 
44. CALAMARI & PERRILLO, supra note 31, at 380 (1987). 
45. Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887), is a renowned case on mutual 
mistake. The contract involved the sale of a cow for $80. According to the seller, both he 
and the buyer believed the cow to be barren; The cow was in fact with calf. Accordingly, the 
Michigan Supreme Court held that the seller was entitled to avoid the contract if it was 
entered into with the understanding of both parties that the cow was barren and not capa-
ble of breeding. 
46. This standard is set forth as follows in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: 
Where a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made as to a basic 
assumption on which the contract was made has a material effect on the agreed 
exchange of performances, the contract is voidable by the adversely affected party 
unless he bears the risk of the mistake under the rule stated in § 154. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 152 (1979). 
47. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 662 (1982) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
158). 
48. For an excellent multi-volume work on restitution, see PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTI-
TUTION (4 vols. 1978). 
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tionary recovery is to place the plaintiff in the same economic posi-
tion as he was in prior to the contracting.49 Finally, a mistaken 
party is not barred for relief because his negligence and failure to 
exercise reasonable care caused the mistake. In order to be pre-
cluded from relief, the mistaken party's fault must amount to a 
failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable stan-
dards of fair dealing. 50 
The Sixth Circuit correctly applied the law of mutual mistake 
and restitution to the instant facts. The mistaken fact was indeed 
a material one, going to the essence of the contract. Both parties 
were mistaken, and the stockbroker's negligence in failing to dis-
cover the mistake and resultant delay in giving notice of the mis-
take does not bar recovery unless it results in a detrimental change 
in position. As illustrated by the court, while it is true that Mann 
incurred new debt obligations as a consequence of the stock sale, 
the value of the mistaken payment has not been lost.5l Accord-
ingly, Mann did not detrimentally change his position in reliance 
on the sale. 
In reaching its decision, the Sixth Circuit relied heavily upon 
two Ohio cases.52 One of those cases, Ohio Co. v. Rosemeier,53 is 
almost exactly on point. In that case, a stock brokerage firm sought 
return of money paid to a client by mistake. The client had used 
the money to payoff her mortgage, a situation in which she argued 
constituted detrimental reliance, preventing the court from grant-
ing a recovery. The Ohio Court of Appeals found no detrimental 
reliance since the client had retained the value of the payment al-
though it had changed form. 54 From an analytical standpoint, the 
Sixth Circuit found the Rosemeier case indistinguishable from the 
49. CALAMARI & PERRILLO, supra note 31, at 649. 
50. A mistaken party's fault in failing to know or discover the facts before making 
the contract does not bar him from avoidance or reformation under the rules 
stated in this Chapter, unless his fault amounts to a failure to act in good faith 
and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 157 (1979). As indicated by the comments to this 
section, the availability of relief would be severly circumscribed if barred by negligence. 
51. 841 F.2d at 306. 
52. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank of Cleveland, 159 Ohio St. 423, 
112 N.E.2d 636 (1953); Ohio Co. v. Rosemeier, 32 Ohio App. 2d 116, 288 N.E.2d 326 (1972). 
53. [d. 
54. 32 App.2d at 120, 288 N.E.2d at 329. 
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instant case.55 
Finally, Mann asserted on appeal that restitution should not 
have been granted because Shearson only requested rescission and 
money damages. The Sixth Circuit responded by noting that 
Shearson's complaint also requested any additional relief to which 
it was entitled.56 The relationship between rescission and restitu-
tion should be noted. Rescission is an avoidance of a transaction, 
generally accompanied by restitution on both sides of the transac-
tion. Accordingly, rescission is a part of many claims for restitu-
tion, particularly in circumstances involving mutual mistake, fraud 
and duress. 57 
C. Damages Under a Reserve Bid Clause 
One case during the survey period involving a damage question 
was decided solely on its facts within the unique and prestigious 
Kentucky industry of horse breeding. In Mizan Arabians u. Pyra-
mid Society,58 the Sixth Circuit was faced with calculating the cor-
rect damages where a horse auctioneer has breached the consign-
ment contract by selling a horse for less than the reserve bid price. 
Mizan is in the business of breeding, showing, and selling Ara-
bian horses. Mizan entered into a consignment agreement with 
Pyramid, a nonprofit organization dedicated to the breeding and 
promotion of purebred Egyptian and Egyptian-related horses, 
whereby one of Mizan's horses was to be sold at auction by Pyra-
mid.59 Under the terms of the agreement, Mizan could establish a 
minimum sale price for the horse by placing a "reserve bid"60 on 
the horse. A reserve bid of $65,000 was placed on this horse, by 
letter dated March 5, 1984. Furthermore, the agreement provided 
that Pyramid was entitled to receive a minimum commission fee of 
12% of the reserve bid, regardless of whether the horse was sold at 
55. 814 F.2d at 306. 
56. [d. at 307. 
57. DAN B. DOBBS, supra note 29, at 254 (1973). 
58. 821 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1987). 
59. [d. at 358. 
60. A reserve bid is used in auction sales to insure that a minimum price is arrived at. 
Reserve bids are used in conjunction with an auction with reserve. In an auction with re-
serve the auctioneer may withdraw the goods at any time until he announces completion of 
the sale. See U.C.C. § 2-238 (1978). 
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auction or not.61 
Prior to the auction, Pyramid requested that Mizan remove the 
reserve bid. It is disputed whether Mizan ever orally removed the 
reserve bid; the reserve bid was not revoked in writing. Neverthe-
less, Pyramid's auctioneer sold the horse for a final bid of $30,000, 
which was $35,000 less than the reserve bid.62 Mizan protested the 
sale to no avail, and eventually brought suit in the federal district 
court of Arkansas against the prospective buyers and Pyramid.63 A 
settlement agreement was reached with the buyers and legal title 
was conveyed by Mizan. Following this settlement, the instant 
cause of action was transferred to the Eastern District of Ken-
tucky, where the case was resolved by a bench trial. The district 
court found that since there was no unequivocal revocation of the 
reserve bid, Pyramid had breached the consignment agreement by 
selling the horse for less than the reserve bid price.64 In computing 
the damage award, the district court determined that the fair mar-
ket value of the horse was $30,000,66 and that the appropriate rem-
edy was the difference between the sale price of $30,000 and the 
reserve bid of $65,000. The amount of $35,000 was then reduced by 
the $5,000 paid in settlement by the purchasers, and by $7,800, 
representing Pyramid's 12% commission. 
On appeal the only issue before the Sixth Circuit was the 
method of calculating damages. Pyramid argued that the damages 
should be limited to the difference between the fair market value 
of the horse and the sale price of the horse, thus resulting in a 
recovery of zero damages. Pyramid argued that since it was unable 
to return the horse, the remedy should be limited to damages 
equal to the fair market value of the horse, found by the trial court 
to be the sale price of $30,000. The Sixth Circuit correctly and suc-
cinctly rejected this flawed argument. Mizan bargained for a mini-
mum sale price of $65,000 (the reserve bid) or the return of the 
horse. Mizan did not bargain for the fair market value of the horse. 
61. Mizan paid $5,000 as a pre-sale consignment fee, which was to be credited towards 
the 12% commission. 821 F.2d at 358. 
62. [d. 
63. The suit was started in Arkansas because the horse had been moved there, and 
Mizan sued to restrain its further movement until title rights could be adjudicated. 
64. 821 F.2d at 359. 
65. Fair market value was the sale price of the horse at auction in light of the fact that 
over four hundred prospective buyers had an opportunity to bid on the horse. [d. 
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In order to fulfill expectation interests, the proper measure of 
damages for contract breach must put the non-breaching party in 
the same position she would have been in had the contract been 
fully performed. Damages which are awarded for this purpose are 
called expectation or loss of the bargain damages because they are 
an attempt to give the aggrieved party the full value of her bargain 
which is the net gain she would have enjoyed had the contract not 
been breached.ss In the instant case, the $65,000 reserve bid is the 
standard against which such damages must be measured. As ob-
served by the Sixth Circuit, adoption of Pyramid's measure of 
damages would encourage auctioneers to disregard reserve bids, 
since the fair market value would generally equal the auction price. 
Damages would always equal zero, even though the auctioneer 
clearly violated the consignment agreement. S7 
Consistent with the overall goal of maintaining the integrity of 
Kentucky's leading industry, the Sixth Circuit held that an auc-
tioneer who sells a horse for less than the reserve bid, and refuses 
to return the horse, is liable for the difference between the reserve 
bid and the price for which the horse sold at auction. 
III. THE FINE LINE SEPARATING CONTRACTS FROM TORTS 
A. Negligent Performance of a Contract 
In Brock v. Consolidated Biomedical Laboratories,ss a diversity 
cause of action, the Sixth Circuit addressed the question of 
whether Michigan law recognizes a cause of action in tort for the 
negligent performance of a contract. The majority of the panel 
concluded that no cause of action exists in Michigan, commenting 
that if such an action existed there would be "no need for contract 
law".s9 The dissenter voted to reverse the district court's dismissal 
66. At least in principle, a party's expectation is measured by the actual worth that 
performance of the contract would have had to him, not the worth that it might 
have had to some hypothetical reasonable person. Damages based on expectation 
should therefore take account of any circumstances peculiar to the situation of the 
injured party, including his own needs and opportunities, his personal values, and 
even his idiosyncracies. 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 47. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1979). 
67. 821 F.2d at 360. 
68. 817 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1987). 
69. Id. at 26. 
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of the negligence claim,70 for reasons set forth in the dissent to 
Haas v. Montgomery Ward.71 
Factually, Brock agreed in writing to sell Clinical Biotest Labo-
ratories, Inc. and its customer accounts to Consolidated Biomedi-
cal Laboratories (Consolidated). The contract provided that Brock 
would receive a percentage of Consolidated's revenues to be paid 
out of the business derived from Brock's previous accounts. 
Howeever, the contract did not contain a due diligence clause. Af-
ter the sale Consolidated engaged in allegedly faulty billing prac-
tices which Brock claimed drove away business. Brock filed this 
suit alleging three causes of action: breach of implied condition of 
the contract, negligent performance of the contract, and misrepre-
sentation. A district court judge dismissed the first two claims for 
failure to state a cause of action.72 Subsequently Brock amended 
the complaint to allege breach of the contract by failing to perform 
in good faith, and retained the misrepresentation claim. The dis-
trict court trial judge, following a bench trial, found for Consoli-
dated on both counts, since Consolidated neither performed the 
contract in bad faith nor made any fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions.73 Brock's appeal in the instant case raised only the dismissal 
of the negligent performance of contract claim. 
Accordingly, the only question before the Sixth Circuit was 
whether Michigan law recognizes a cause of action in tort for negli-
gent performance of a contract. The failure of the panel to arrive 
at a unanimous decision, results from the frequently confusing fact 
that a tort action may arise in the context of misperformance of a 
contract. The classic fact pattern involved the common carrier, 
where the carrier would not only be liable for breach of contract 
when the train derailed, but also in tort for negligent injury to a 
passenger.74 As caselaw developed, American courts extended tort 
70. [d. 
71. 812 F.2d 1015 (6th Cir. 1987). The Haas case involved an employment discrimina-
tion, wrongful discharge fact pattern. The case was decided by the same panel of judges as 
that of the instant case. The panel split on the same issue, the existence of a tort cause for 
negligent performance of contract. In Haas, the tort claim charged negligent wrongful dis-
charge based on negligent evaluation of job performance. 
72. 817 F.2d at 25. 
73. [d. 
74. See Kelly v. Metropolitan St. R. R., 1 Q.B. 944 (1895); Webber v. Herkimer & Mo-
hawk St., 109 N.Y. 311, 16 N.E. 358 (1888); Williamson v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 67 Cal. 
App. 2d 250, 153 P.2d at 990 (1945). 
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liability for misfeasance to virtually every type of contract where 
defective performance may injure the promisee.75 Thus, physicians 
treating patients, beauty shops giving permanent waves, and sup-
pliers of defective goods, just to mention a few examples, have 
been held liable in tort for their negligence which arose in a con-
tract setting.76 
In order to establish a cause of action in negligence, three ele-
ments are required: a legal duty must exist, the defendant must 
fail to exercise ordinary care in the performance of that duty, and 
damage to the plaintiff must proximately result from the failure. 77 
The problem element with establishing negligence in a contract 
context is the existence of a legal duty. 
[W]hile this duty of care, as an essential element of actionable negli-
gence, arises by operation of law, it may and frequently does arise out of 
a contractual relationship, the theory being that accompanying every 
contract is a common-law duty to perform with ordinary care the thing 
agreed to be done, and that a negligent performance constitutes a tort as 
well as a breach of contract.'s 
Based upon the quoted language, it would appear at least in 
Michigan that every breach of contact would also constitute a 
breach of the duty of care element, thereby establishing the tort 
claim. To the contrary, Michigan cases clearly differentiate be-
tween misfeasance of a contract performance, which is actionable 
in tort, and nonfeasance of a contractual obligation, which gives 
rise only to an action on the contract.79 
Thus, the tort action naturally arises in some contract breaches 
and not in others. While the line is not always clear as to where 
inaction ceases and misfeasance begins, the line appears to distin-
75. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 92, at 660 (W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. 
Keeton & D. Owen 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON). 
76. Over the years, these numerous fact patterns developed into the specialized and indi-
vidual tort claims of medical malpractice and product liability. 
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (19 ). See, e.g., Knight v. United States, 498 
F. Supp. 315 (E.D. Mich. 1980). 
78. The language is from the Michigan Supreme Court opinion in Clark v. Dalman, 379 
Mich. 251, 261, 150 N.W.2d 755,760 (1967), and is cited in the dissent to Haas v. Montgom-
ery Ward, 812 F.2d at 1017. For a discussion of the case, see supra note 71. 
79. The leading case is Hart v. Ludwig, 347 Mich. 559, 564, 79 N.W.2d 895, 898 (1956). 
See also Kewin v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 401, 295 N.W.2d 50 (1980); 
Brewster v. Martin Marietta Aluminum Sales, Inc., 145 Mich. App. 641, 378 N.W.2d 558 
(1985). 
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guish whether the defendant's performance, as distinct from her 
promise, has affected interests of the plaintiff beyond the expected 
benefits of the contract.80 When applied to employment discharge 
cases, "the affirmative act of discharging an employee is uniformly 
considered to be no more than non-performance of the agreement 
to continue employment,"81 and therefore not actionable as a tort. 
When this demarcation is applied to the instant facts, the major-
ity properly affirmed the district court's dismissal for failure to 
state a cause of action. Consolidated's alleged failure to properly 
perform the contract affected only Brock's expected benefits under 
the contract itself. There was no breach of duty distinct from the 
breach of contact to create an actionable tort. 
B. Disclaimers of Reliance 
The case of AgriStor Leasing v. Saylor,82 addressed without de-
termining the effect of a disclaimer of reliance in a contact on a 
claim for tortious misrepresentation. The concurring opinion drew 
a definite distinction between disclaimers of liability and disclaim-
ers of reliance, and found that a contract which contains a valid 
disclaimer of reliance, in the absence of competent evidence to the 
contrary, may be enough to justify granting a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict of a tortious misrepresentation ac-
tion.83 The majority opinion deferred to the decision of the district 
court construing Tennessee law to hold contract disclaimers inef-
fective to limit liability for misrepresentations.84 
Early in 1980, the Saylors, were approached by Dowdy, a sales 
representative of Hermitage Harvestore Systems, to purchase feed 
storage structures and related equipment for their dairy farm. The 
Harvestore feed storage system was represented to the Saylors, 
through the literature of the manufacturer, A.O. Smith Harvestore 
Products, Inc. (AOSHPI), and orally by Dowdy, as being "oxygen 
limiting".85 This feature of the Harvestore feed storage system was 
supposed to keep the feed virtually airtight, prevent spoilage, and 
80. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 75, § 92, at 661-62. 
81. [d. Accordingly, the majority opinion correctly decided Haas v. Montgomery Ward, 
an employment discharge case, discussed at note 71 supra. 
82. 803 F.2d 1401 (6th Cir. 1986). 
83. [d. at 1410. 
84. [d. at 1407. 
85. [d. at 1403. 
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increase milk production in dairy cows. Dowdy showed the Saylors 
a film called "The Harvestore System" and a book published by 
AOSHPI entitled The Winning System. Both the movie and the 
book were promotional materials which praised the capabilities of 
the Harvestore structures.86 In March, the Saylors contacted to 
purchase the Harvestore system from Hermitage. The contract was 
subsequently financed through AgriStor Leasing Company. 
The Harvestore structures were operational by July, and within 
one month the Saylors' dairy herd began to develop problems. In 
the following year the cows' condition steadily worsened, and vet-
erinarians contacted to treat the problem could not ascertain the 
source of the cows starvation.87 Early in 1982, the Saylors finally 
liquidated the remaining herd, and defaulted on their payments to 
AgriStor. AgriStor repossessed the equipment and in October of 
1983, filed this suit for the deficiency. The Saylors answered and 
filed a third-party complaint against the instant appellants; 
Dowdy, Hermitage and AOSHPI, seeking damages caused by the 
defective product and the misrepresentations made about the 
product. 
The Saylors confessed judgment on the AgriStor claim and a 
summary judgment was granted as to the remaining payments. 
The Saylors' claim against the three appellants were tried to a 
jury, which returned joint and several verdicts against all three ap-
pellants for one million dollars in compensatory and punitive 
damages. 
Numerous issues were appealed to the Sixth Circuit, however, 
the instant opinion discussed only three in detail, one being dis-
positive and requiring a new trial. The Sixth Circuit determined 
that the district court's failure to instruct the jury concerning the 
statute of limitations constituted reversible error. Throughout the 
trial the appellants maintained that the action was barred by the 
statute of limitations because Saylor knew of the cause of injury to 
the cows and of the alleged tortfeasors more than three years prior 
to filing the complaint. Testimony adduced at trial was conflicting 
on this question. Accordingly, the jury should have been instructed 
to decide when the Saylors knew the occasion, manner and means 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
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by which the injury to their property occurred.88 
The Sixth Circuit also addressed the award of punitive damages. 
Tennessee law permits punitive damages in cases involving fraud.89 
Thus, the misrepresentations would have to be fraudulent in order 
to approve punitive damages. The Sixth Circuit found that there 
was sufficient evidence presented to go to the jury on the question 
of whether the misrepresentations were fraudulent, and therefore, 
the instructions on punitive damages was proper. Two of the ap-
pellants contended that punitive damages could not be awarded, 
because their financial condition had not been established at trial. 
The Sixth Circuit applied Tennessee law that punitive damages 
may be awarded against joint tortfeasors when the financial worth 
of only one of the tortfeasors is introduced in evidence.9o 
From a contracts law standpoint, the most interesting discussion 
in the instant case involved the disclaimer language of the 
purchase agreement: 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND RELIANCE 
I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTOOD THE TERMS AND CONDI-
TIONS OF THIS PURCHASE ORDER INCLUDING THE WARRAN-
TIES, DISCLAIMERS AND TERMS AND CONDITIONS HEREIN 
GIVEN TO ME, EITHER BY THE MANUFACTURER OR THE 
SELLER. I RELY ON NO OTHER PROMISES OR CONDITIONS 
AND REGARD THAT AS REASONABLE BECAUSE THESE ARE 
FULLY ACCEPTABLE TO ME.91 
Appellants argued that they were not liable to the Saylors on the 
fraudulent misrepresentation claim because this disclaimer clause 
precluded the Saylors from relying on the published and oral rep-
resentations concerning the Harvestore system. Since reliance is a 
necessary element in a misrepresentation cause of action,92 a fail-
ure to rely on the representation would prevent recovery. The dis-
trict court, however, refused to give this effect to the disclaimer, 
denied the request for summary judgment, submitted the tortious 
misrepresentation claims to the jury, and subsequently denied a 
directed verdict on the basis of the disclaimer.93 The Sixth Circuit, 
88. Id. at 1406. 
89. Inland Container Corp. v. March, 529 S.W.2d 43 (Tenn. 1975). 
90. Huckeby v. Spangler, 563 S.W.2d 555 (Tenn. 1978). 
91. 803 F.2d at 1406. 
92. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 75, § 105, at 728. 
93. 803 F.2d at 1407. 
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affirmed the district court, reiterating the deference which is given 
to district judges sitting in diversity cases interpreting state law. 
The concurrence viewed the disclaimer language as a disclaimer of 
reliance rather than a disclaimer of liability, and found "no reason 
that a contractual disclaimer of reliance cannot be used as evi-
dence . . . of whether the plaintiff had relied upon the 
misrepresentation. "94 
Undoubtedly, there is a difference between a disclaimer of liabil-
ity and a disclaimer of reliance, although the Tennessee cases do 
not clearly differentiate between the two.91i Nevertheless, it is in-
deed troublesome to permit the appellants to disclaim all reliance 
that the Saylors may have placed on the movie and book used to 
describe the Harvestore system with a paragraph in the standard 
form contract used by the manufacturer and dealer. The appel-
lants extensively used these promotional marketing materials, ex-
pecting that they would help to consumate sales. Permitting such 
reliance to be negated by a disclaimer is akin to permitting all ex-
press warranties to be disclaimed including a description of the 
goods which amounts to an express warranty. Both the Uniform 
Commercial Code and its chief commentators disapprove of such 
an inconsistent and unfair analysis.96 The manufacturer and dealer 
used substantially more than salesperson's puffing to sell the feed 
storage system. It is unlikely that the reliance based upon these 
extensive marketing tools is negated by a paragraph in the stan-
dard contract drafted by the manufacturer or dealer. 
94. [d. at 1410. 
95. Walker Truck Contractors, Inc. v. Crane Carrier Co., 405 F. Supp. 911 (E.D. Tenn. 
1975); Cooper Paintings & Coatings, Inc. v. SCM Corp., 62 Tenn. App. 13,457 S.W.2d 864 
(1970). 
96. We hope courts will reach similar conclusions and strike down attempted dis-
claimers in cases in which the seller includes a description of the article which 
amounts to a warranty and then attempts to disclaim all express warranties. To 
illustrate further: assume that the sales contract describes machinery to be sold as 
a "haybaler" and then attempts to disclaim all express warranties. If the machine 
failed to bale hay and buyer sued, we would argue that the disclaimer is ineffec-
tive. In our judgment, the description of the machine as a "haybaler" is a war-
ranty that the machine will bale hay and, in the words of 2-316, a negation or 
limitation ought to be "inoperative" since it is inconsistent with the warranty. 
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 433 
(1980). See also U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 4 (1978). 
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IV. RISK OF Loss 
In Commonwealth Propane Co. u. Petrosol International, Inc.,97 
the Sixth Circuit applied Ohio's version of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code to allocate risk of loss among an original seller, a mid-
dleperson, and the ultimate buyer where an underground propane 
gas storage facility collapsed and the stored gas could no longer be 
removed. 
In 1982, Cal Gas Corporation (Cal Gas) contracted to sell Pe-
trosol International, Inc. (Petrosol) 10,000 barrels of propane 
stored at an underground storage facility for a price of fifty-seven 
cents per gallon, to be delivered on demand on or before March 31, 
1983.98 According to the purchase acknowledgment form: 
Deliveries shall be made as, when and where specified on the reverse 
hereof. Title to products delivered shall pass to Buyer upon completion 
of loading thereof into tank trucks furnished by Buyer, upon delivery 
thereof in a tank car to carrier, upon arrival thereof in a tank truck fur-
nished by Seller alongside unloading facilities at destination, or as speci-
fied on the reverse hereof, as the case may be.99 
Petrosol immediately sold the propane to Commonwealth Pro-
pane Company (Commonwealth) for fifty-eight cents per gallon. 
The sales acknowledgment form sent by Petrosol to Common-
wealth provided in relevant part: 
Title to products delivered shall pass to Buyer upon completion of load-
ing the same into tank trucks, upon delivery of products in a tank car to 
carrier, upon delivery thereof in a tank truck furnished by Seller along-
side Buyer's storage facilities at destination, or as stipulated on the face 
hereof, as the case may be. Thereafter Buyer shall bear all risk of and be 
solely liable for any loss or damage caused by or attributable to said 
products, or to their transportation, care, handling, resale or use. 100 
On the front of the acknowledgment form was the caption "to be 
delivered" next to five boxes indicating types of delivery methods. 
However, none of the boxes were marked. 
After receiving Petrosol's payment, Cal Gas sent a confirmation 
97. 818 F.2d 522 (6th Cir. 1987). 
98. Id. at 524. 
99. Id. at 526. The district court found this language from the purchase acknowledgment 
form to be determinative of when risk of loss passed. 
lOO. Id. at 528. The district court found this language from the sales acknowledgment 
form to be determinative of when risk of loss passed. 
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of distribution form to the underground facility indicating a prod-
uct flow from Cal Gas to Petrosol to Commonwealth. A confirma-
tion of distribution form was also mailed to Petrosol. A second 
transaction with the same three parties for an additional 10,000 
barrels of propane on the same contract terms occurred in Novem-
ber of 1982. Identical paper work was used by the parties. In Feb-
ruary of 1983, a wall in the underground storage facility collapsed, 
and the 20,000 barrels of propane subject to the agreements of 
these three parties was lost or destroyed before Commonwealth 
was able to remove it. Commonwealth brought the instant action 
against Petrosol and Cal Gas for damages based upon breach of 
contract. Both parties defended by asserting that the propane had 
been delivered to Commonwealth and that risk of loss had passed 
upon delivery. Petrosol also cross-claimed against Cal Gas, con-
tending that Cal Gas had not delivered the propane, and that con-
sequently, risk of loss fell on Cal Gas.101 The district court granted 
Commonwealth summary judgment against Petrosol, and Petrosol 
was granted summary judgment against Cal Gas, on the basis of 
the previously quoted purchase acknowledgment and sales ac-
knowledgment forms. In both cases the district court found that 
risk of loss was governed by the agreements of the parties, and 
that risk of loss had not passed from the seller to the buyer in 
either transaction. 
The major issue on appeal was which of the three parties bore 
the risk of loss as to the stored propane. The Sixth Circuit cor-
rectly looked to the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in Ohio 
to resolve the issue.102 In applying that provision, the first question 
101. Id. at 525. 
102. The Ohio version of § 2-509 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides as follows: 
(A) Where the contract requires or authorizes the seller to ship the goods by 
carrier: 
(1) if it does not require him to deliver them at a particular destination, the 
risk of loss passes to the buyer when the goods are duly delivered to the 
carrier even though the shipment is under reservation as provided in sec-
tion 1302.49 of the Revised Code; but 
(2) if it does require him to deliver them at a particular destination and the 
goods are there duly tendered while in the possession of the carrier, the risk 
of loss passes to the buyer when the goods are there duly so tendered as to 
enable the buyer to take delivery. 
(B) Where the good are held by a bailee to be delivered without being moved, the 
risk of loss passes to the buyer: 
(1) on his receipt of a negotiable document of title covering the goods; or 
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is whether the agreement of the parties allocates risk of loss.I03 
Under the Code's overall philosophy of freedom of contract, the 
parties are free to allocate risk of loss in their agreement. However, 
in the absence of agreement, the Code allocates risk of loss among 
the parties, based upon the fact pattern of the individual case. Dif-
ferent subsections apply, depending on whether the contract in-
volves: (1) goods delivered by a common carrier; (2) goods held by 
a third party bailee to be delivered without being moved; or (3) 
goods delivered directly from seller to buyer without the participa-
tion of a third party carrier or bailee. These three fact patterns 
cover the subsections of the risk of loss provisions. 
In the instant case, if the agreement of the parties does not gov-
ern, the Code subsection dealing with goods held by a third party 
bailee applies, since the goods were stored at Lake Underground 
Storage. 104 
The Sixth Circuit addressed each contract separately. First, the 
court examined the contract between Cal Gas and Petrosol, and 
specifically the purchase acknowledgment language relied on by 
the district court. The Sixth Circuit rejected the finding of the dis-
trict court that the language concerning passage of title from the 
purchase acknowledgment constituted a contrary agreement of the 
parties allocating the risk of loss. Under the Code, risk of loss is a 
separate and distinct question from passage of title. Accordingly, 
title passage does not determine when risk of loss passes. Since the 
contract between Cal Gas and Petrosol did not allocate risk of loss, 
the Code subsection covering goods held by a third party bailee 
(2) on acknowledgment by the bailee of the buyer's right to possession of 
the goods; or 
(3) after his receipt of a non-negotiable document of title or other written 
direction to deliver, as provided in division (D)(2) of section 1302.47 of the 
Revised Code. 
(C) In any case not within division (A) or (B) of this section, the risk of loss passes 
to the buyer on his receipt of the goods if the seller is a merchant; otherwise the 
risk passes to the buyer on tender of delivery. 
(D) The provisions of this section are subject to contrary agreement of the parties 
and to the provisions of sections 1302.40 and 1302.54 or the Revised Code. 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.53 (Anderson 1979). 
103. Subsection (D) of § 1302.53, supra note 102, authorizes controlling contrary agree-
ment of the parties. 
104. Subsection (B) of § 1302.53, supra note 102, allocates risk of loss when goods are 
held by a third party bailee, like a warehouse or grainary, or in this case, an underground 
storage facility. 
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governed. 1011 The propane was held by a bailee to be delivered 
without being moved, and the risk of loss passed when Cal Gas 
sent its confirmation of distribution form to both Petrosol and 
Lake Underground, the storage facility. At that time, both the 
buyer, Petrosol, and the bailee, Lake Underground, knew that the 
goods were being held for the buyer rather than for the seller, Cal· 
Gas, and under the Code provision risk of loss passed to the buyer, 
Petrosol. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district 
court's grant of summary judgment for Petrosol, and remanded the 
case for entry of summary judgment in favor of Cal Gas.106 
Allocation of risk of loss between Petrosol and Commonwealth 
was not as easy according to the court. The sales acknowledgment 
form did allocate risk, but only in conjunction with delivery of the 
goods. Since no method of delivery box was checked on the form, 
the language on the sales acknowledgment form was not conclu-
sive. Furthermore, the term of the agreement, providing free stor-
age for five months, was inconsistent with the sales acknowledg-
ment's risk of loss language. The Sixth Circuit held, in light of this 
factual dispute, that the issue of risk of loss was inappropriate for 
summary disposition. Therefore, the court reversed the district 
court's grant of summary judgment to Commonwealth, and re-
manded the action for further proceedings. l07 
105. [d. 
106. 818 F.2d at 528. 
107. [d. at 531. 
